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Sugar  coated  bullets: Corrupt ion  and the n e w  e c o n o m i c  order  
in China  
MARK FINDLAY and THOMAS CHIU CHOR-WING 
Department of Law, City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, Argyle Centre, Tower II, 700 Nathan Road, 
Mongkok, Kowloon, Hong Kong 
Abstract. The recent political debate concerning the influence of corruption on the "new econom- 
ic order" in the People's Republic of China is unique not only for its detailed and public 
manifestations, but also because it works around the acceptance of some degree of corporate 
private ownership of the means of production within China. The concern for corruption in 
Chinese government and commerce is not, of itself, novel. 
We prefer in this paper briefly to focus on the economic and political environment from within 
which this concern has been generated, to comment on the significance for the Government of the 
PRC in associating the pall of corruption with the undermining of more capitalist economic 
reform, and then to examine how the legal definitions and controls on corruption have been 
transformed to complement a new political agenda. Associated with this, it has been necessary to 
advance some rather tentative predictions concerning the development of new anti-corruption 
initiatives in the PRC, their justifications, and pressures on the economic transition which is said to 
be corruption generative. 
Speculation about the future face of economic corruption in China is of limited value when one 
is interested in questions of regulation and control. As the definition, indication and interpretation 
of corruption is a political process which may pay little regard to realistic indicators, so too the 
creation of control initiatives may not be dependent on predictions of actual developments in 
graft. We have endeavoured to show that recent regulatory programmes in the PRC themselves 
indicate much about the commercial contradictions that underly the new economic order, as well 
as evidencing the socio-legal dilemmas inherent in anti-corruption official discourse. 
Introduction 
Recent statements by the most senior political figures in the Peoples Republic 
of China (PRC) have evidenced a new and urgent concern for the effect on 
economic re-adjustment, of wide spread corruption throughout Chinese com- 
mercial and administrative life. Zhao Ziyang was quoted in the Peoples Daily 
as admitting that 
now there is indeed corruption amongst some party and government offi- 
cials. If we do not take effective measures to control and overcome it, this 
phenomenon will spread and deepen. If we let matters drift the new eco- 
nomic order will not be established, the reforms will not continue. 1 
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What is interesting about such warnings is not so much the admissions they 
contain, but rather the conscious political association between corrupt practic- 
es and the potential success in "capitalising" the PRC. 
The Hong Kong press has been quick to adopt the official position that 
corruption is viewed in the PRC as the biggest threat to China's ambitious and 
troubled programme of economic reform. In commenting on the moves initi- 
ated by Deng Xiaoping to curb corruption, The South China Morning Post 
highlighted a recent automobile trade racket which operated between Guan- 
dong and Hunan, and involved military police and government employees. 2 
The editorial reflected on the ever flourishing weed of corruption in China and 
speculated that 
exposure to western business practices, which themselves are not always 
blameless, is only recent, and there are years of social and cultural habits to 
break before deals can be made quickly and cleanly as a matter of course. In 
the past some Chinese leaders blamed contact with the west for the decline 
in moral standards. With Chinese officials being exposed for the first time to 
the lure of capitalist luxuries, it is inevitable that some will not be able to 
resist the temptation to take more than they deserve. But avarice can be a 
force for progress if properly harnessed, as Hong Kong proves every day. 3 
The socio-legal and political significance of the present concern in the PRC 
about corruption will not be appreciated by adopting such a paternalistic and 
naive personalised analysis of the phenomenon. We prefer in this paper briefly 
to focus on the economic and political environment from within which this 
concern has been generated, to comment on the significance for the Govern- 
ment of the PRC in associating the pall of corruption with the undermining of 
more capitalist economic reform, and then to examine how the legal defini- 
tions and controls on corruption have been transformed to complement a new 
political agenda. 
"The New Economic  Order" in brief 
One simple way to understand the economic transformation which the PRC is 
currently undergoing is to examine the Special Economic Zones (SEZ). The 
success story amongst these zones is that which centres on Shenzhen, the 
closest large Chinese city to Hong Kong. Like the other SEZ's, the Shenzhen 
Special Zone has a degree of regional economic and administrative autonomy 
which is permitted by the central government in order to encourage economic 
development of a western style. This economic restructuring rests on the 
promotion of joint venture commercial activity. As a consequence the central 
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government has benefited from an inflow of foreign capital at the expense of its 
universal commitment to communal ownership of the means of production, 
and the struggle against the structures of capitalist profit making. 
The Shenzhen Special Zone has been favoured by its strategic position in the 
Pearl River estuary and hence its physical and financial proximity to the 
markets of Hong Kong. But as the economy of the PRC has benefited from the 
Shenzhen experiment, the central government has paid a higher price than 
simply that of ideological compromise. The powerful conservative element in 
the many organs of the party, the Central Committee, and the National 
People's Congress, has been able to focus on the growing evils, both individual 
and organisational, which seem to be an inevitable consequence of this region- 
al capitalization. In so doing this opposition has been able to challenge the 
wider programme of economic reform which Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang 
are sponsoring. It is a process of undermining the new superstructure by 
highlighting the flaws in its favoured operational bases. 
This critique has not simply dwelt on the greedy party official who believes 
the only way to do business in China is for the other party to offer favours 
from expensive gifts to entertainment at restaurants and night clubs, in- 
cluding outright cash bribes. 4 
Its more telling incursions have exposed corruption of an organisational and 
administrative nature which is openly in violation of the most basic socialist 
principles. Such revelations can tar the "new economic order" with the same 
brush. Deng Xiaoping has responded by recently threatening to dismiss pro- 
vincial leaders who ignore the directions of central government. In particular, 
the Communist Party's Central Committee has directed one of its attacks on 
corruption against Government and party officials who exploit an economy to 
some extent trapped between central planning and market freedom. » But 
Deng's fierce criticisms of nepotism and corruption have not been reserved for 
individuals alone. As the new factor of joint ventures has entered the Chinese 
economic scene, so too the focus of anti corruption discourse has moved to 
attacks on state-owned companies and other forms of business conglomerates. 
The potential subjects of corrupt practices in China are now also viewed in a 
corporate guise. 
The practical consequences of this realisation have seen Deng Xiaoping 
ordering several major conglomerates to be stripped of their tax privileges, 
untier the accusations of "official profiteering". As such this is said to amount 
to the use by state-owned companies of political contacts and special privileges 
to gain access to much needed state-controlled goods and materials, which 
they then seil at a huge profit on the fledging free market. 6 
But such regulation of commercial activity in China has not been spasmodic 
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or isolated. The Chinese press has reported that hundreds of trading compa- 
nies have been ordered to halt business, and tight controls have been imposed 
on the bank accounts of thousands more, as part of the mounting anti- 
corruption campaign. The prevailing form of corruption, and one which is 
viewed with great concern in the light of skyrocketing inflation in the PRC, is 
speculation in scarce goods. Recently introduced banking regulations in Beij- 
ing prevent companies from withdrawing more than 500 yuan ($130 US ap- 
prox.) a day. These are an attempt to force such corporations to settle trans- 
actions by cheque, which in turn may make corrupt business transactions more 
traceable. It is also an attempt to regulate the source of cash into the black 
market, which may be chanelled to the west and reinvested in China, attract- 
ing a minimum of regulation and centralised interference as a result. 
In order to understand more fully the nature of corrupt practices which have 
recently come to light in the Special Economic Zones, it might be useful to 
describe several relevant cases which were disposed of recently in the Peoples 
Court of Shenzhen. From 1985 to 1987 there have been 216 cases of"economic 
crime" reported in this Zone, resulting in 216 people being convicted. 
Amongst these cases, 100 concentrated on corruption - related behaviour. 7 
One such case involved one Lam Shing, the manager of the Sha Tau Kok 
Commercial Trading Company. Lam Shing was also a member of the commu- 
nist party. It was found that he conspired with a group of thirteen people, 
including the accountant, cashier and the deputy manager of the company, to 
forge temporary payroll sheets so as to pretend that the compagny had em- 
ployed a number of temporary workers. This deception was further sub- 
stantiated by forged documents, and false claims for expenses. Through these 
methods the conspirators misappropriated 32766RMB, 4535 Foreign Ex- 
change Certificates (FEC) and $ 54136 HK. They all received prison sentences 
as a result. 
In May and November 1985, Lau Tat Wai who was formerly the manager of 
the Lo Wu District Material Supply Company, borrowed $ 30000 US from a 
joint venture company, and gave it to bis son who lived in Hong Kong. In April 
1986 he appropriated a similar amount from one of the company's subsidiaries, 
claiming that the money was necessary to conclude a deal which was secured 
by the parent company. In fact he used this sum to settle his earlier loan. When 
the case came to light in 1987 he was struck oft the membership of the party and 
was relieved of his managerial responsibilities. The court sentenced him to 3 
years imprisonment, suspended for a four year period, s 
In 1985 Chang Way Lap, (former deputy director of the Shenzhen Film 
Company) represented her company in negotiating a joint venture with Hong 
Kong merchants. On the setting up of this joint venture she took advantage of 
her position so as to misappropriate stare capital totalling 1.15 million RMB 
and $ 3 million HK. In addition she later misappropriated a further 18000 
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RMB and $ 20000 HK. In April 1987 she was suspended from her duties in the 
company. Since that time she also borrowed $ 70000 HK from the Hong Kong 
company of which she was a joint partner. This was done without the permis- 
sion of the other joint venturers. She was charged with corruption under the 
provisions for administrative procedure in the Schenzhen SEZ. 
These examples give testimony to the extent to which corrupt practices have 
adapted to the corporate environment of the new economic order. They also 
indicate that middle management, and not just senior party officials are being 
identified as the corrupt. 
The politicai utility of a connection between corruption and economic reform 
Since the mid 1980's the PRC government has permitted the formation of 
semi-independent companies in China in the hope of stimulating competition 
and efficiency, and attracting foreign capital. Yet in so doing the government 
has strictly limited the number of business licences which it issues. This led to a 
new potential source of corruption in that the only people who can get such 
licences, it is alleged, are those with good party connections. "The Market" 
newspaper is quoted as stating that, "behind every profiteer is a big protec- 
tor ' ,  9 
The practical and ideological contradictions inherent in the development of 
China's "socialist commodity economy" are becoming impossible to paper 
over with the cover of Maoist ideology. In fact in recent years the supporters of 
Deng Xiaoping have chosen to reinterpret the role of ideology in modern 
China. One of the main messages to emerge from the 13th National People's 
Congress (1987) was that economic development would be the only yardstick 
for progress. A recent editorial in The People's Daily called for a "revamping 
of the ideological work". 
The Basic criterion for judging the success of ideological work is whether it 
can fully arouse the initiative and creativity of the masses and cadres and 
effectively protect, enhance and emancipate productive forces. 
The Guangming Daily takes this theme further by excouraging Chinese ideo- 
logues to 
pluck up our courage and restudy capitalism. Bourgeois democracy and law 
have been further improved and developed. Some reasonable and useful 
things in the ideological and cultural fields in capitalist society have tran- 
scended the limits of time and space. 1° 
However the legacy of Mao both theoretical and practical cannot simply be 
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subsumed and transformed by the new ideology of pragmatism, or by Deng's 
experiments with capitalist economic development. Not only are the conserva- 
tive opponents of the new economic order massed against the incursions of 
capitalist enterprise, but a very significant sector of the Chinese people hold 
the Maoist image of a people's China with shared wealth and hardship, still 
dear to their hearts. These are the people who also blame the new economic 
reforms for the 40+ percent inflation now plaguing the PRC, and its conse- 
quent reduction of living standards. 11 It is they who find the obvious in- 
equalities between life as it is said to be in the Special Economic Zones, and as 
it is in the remainder of China, difficult to accept. It may taken more than the 
restrictions of the household registration system (S Dutton 1986), to buttress 
the Special Economic Zones against a sweU of discontent which may arise as a 
result. This is despite the universal attractions offered by the freeing of the 
supply of consumer durables which the SEZ's can offer. 
The leaders of the new economic direction are sensitive to the privileged 
position of the Special Economic Zones. They are particularly aware that they 
should not be seen to allow the capitalist characteristics of business life in the 
Zones to lead to a greater potential for corruption and profiteering in these 
environments than appears to be the case throughout the rest of China. Thus it 
was not surprising to read that; 
Shenzhen special economic zone is to pay central government 20 per cent of 
the foreign currency it earns through exports. Currently the special econom- 
ic zones in China can retain 100 per cent of the foreign exchange they earn in 
the zone for future development but the rules will change on January 1 
(1989). China traders in Shenzhen, and officials of the municipal govern- 
ment, have said that the new move is part of a crackdown on profiteers and 
speculators in the zone . . .  Other provinces and cities in China must pay the 
majority of foreign currency they earn in order to support the development 
of the country. The result was that profiteers and speculators became active 
in Shenzhen, using the foreign currency to buy "cheap" yuan in the black 
m a r k e t . . ,  and using the money to buy products from the other provinces 
•. .  Some goods from the zone can be priced more competitively than those 
from areas that do not deal in as much foreigh exchange. . .  The vice-mayor 
(of Shenzhen) claimed that the central government requested Shenzhen to 
pay 20 per cent of its foreign currency with the aim of stopping the competi- 
tion between provinces in purchasing products and stabilising the price of 
China-made products . . .  A senior official of the municipality disclosed that 
almost 40 per cent of Shenzhen's exports are purchased from other prov- 
inces at higher than standard prices.12 
The focus of these criticisms is that capitalist excess leads to corruption and this 
151 
then directly undermines the life of the Chinese people. This is not a new tune 
in the PRC. Since the Communist state was established in 1949, the association 
between capitalism and corruption constantly has been drawn in official pol- 
icy, and as such has formed a principal motivation for the efforts against 
corruption in the PRC. Further, the association between corruption and the 
challenge to economic stability also always has been clearly manifest in PRC 
policy initiatives. For example, the Criminal Law of the PRC (adopted by the 
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress 1979) classifies the 
offences of smuggling and speculation (art. 118), taking of advantages by 
government officials (art. 119), and the misappropriation of state funds (art. 
126) under the heading "Crimes of Undermining the Socialist Economic 
Order". 
In his address to the Third International Anti-Corruption Conference 
(1987), Xie Baoghui (Director, Economic Crime Prosecution Department, 
PRC) emphasised the social harm posed by corruption: "Corruption not only 
sabotages the property relationship protected by law, but also ruins the good 
prestige of state personnel". Yet interestingly Xie was particular to point out 
that "the work of anti-corruption (sic) in China is not contradictory to the 
policy of revitalising China's domestic economy". This is consistent with the 
current efforts by the present "reformist" administration of the PRC to 
colonise the "moral highground" of anti-corruptionism. Zhao Ziyang has 
taken the barbs of his economic critics and returned them by alleging that it is 
corruption which is threatening the realisation of the new economic order. He 
chooses to ignore the suggestion that it is the socialist commodity economy 
which itself is promoting such corruption, while joining the anti-corruption 
chorus, but for distinctly different reasons. The recognition of the socio- 
economic threat posed by corruption is the common ground. The measure of 
patriotism has become the vigour with which it is attacked. But while Zhao's 
crifics use the spectre of corruption to attack his reforms and suggest that the 
cure for corruption may be found in dismantling the new economic order, his 
position is that the eradication of corruption will significantly ensure the 
realisation of the success of this new order. The debate about where corruption 
originates has been purposefully bi-passed in the scramble for the legitimacy 
inherent within the anti-corruption posture. 
The official attack on corruption 
On 21 January 1988 the Supplementary Provisions of the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress Regarding the Punishment of Corruption 
and Bribery, were adopted by the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Sixth Congress (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyun Gongba). 13 
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These comprised two sets of regulations providing for the severe punishment 
of smuggling, corruption and other related offences They made further 
amendments to the previously mentioned Criminal Law of the PRC, more 
clearly defining certain offences and giving more concrete guidelines for 
penalties. We will examine these provisions in more detail when discussing the 
legal dimension of the anti-corruption initiatives in the PRC. 
More recently (21 September 1988) the State Council promulgated detailed 
ù interim provisions on the administrative measure against state office workers 
for embezzlement and bribery". Unlike previous guidelines this one specified 
which punishments were to be meted out for which crimes. A week later the 
Finance Vice Minister Chi Haibin inaugurated a "national campaign to rid the 
country of financial irregularities" including tax evasion and falsifying of 
accounts. "Those who take advantage of the present (two tiered) price system 
to profiteer from production materials and consumer goods in short supply will 
be punished", he warned. The following day the State Administration of 
Commodity Prices issued new "Regulations for Handling Price Violations in 
Conducting Tax Finance and Price Inspections", and the Foreign Trade Minis- 
try released its own rules to keep "government functionaries honest and 
upright". On 24 September the Stare Council sent out a circular prohibiting 
"all units in China flora recklessly distributing money, materials and gifts," 
including "unauthorised bonuses, subsidies and allowances". 
Hubei province, under central pressure, announced on 25 September, what 
was intended as a precedent setting measure forbidding all government de- 
partments and offices "from buying cars and building new offices for two 
years". The next day Premier Li Peng signed an order to tax banquets in an 
effort to discourage lavish entertainment at the states expense. The State 
Council, under Li Peng's supervision, next decided to pose "independent" 
price inspectors in provincial and municipal capitals throughout the nation. 
The Supreme People's Court meanwhile issued a circular ordering a "crack- 
down on economic offenders", especially profiteering officials. 
The next major official initiative against corruption was Deng Xiaoping's 
attack on several of China's largest state-run trading and investment conglom- 
erates, including one affiliated with his eldest son. Premier Li Peng then 
capped oft this stage of the anti-corruption effort when on 9 0 c t o b e r  he 
launched a nationwide "campaign to call an immediate halt to thousands of 
c.onstruction projects including some under way". This was an attempt to deal 
with the serious bottlenecks and shortages which have lead to widespread 
corruption within China's construction industry. As a result of these and other 
concerns associated with the pace of economic development in China seven 
foreign joint ventures worth an estimated 2 billion yuan were cancelled or 
postponed some three weeks later) 4 
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The move coincides with the news that Communist Party Secretary General 
Zhao Ziyang has set specific goals of reducing investments in fixed assets 
next year by 50 billion yuan, a drop of about 20 percent from this year. He 
said that overall economic growth should be slowed to 10 percent or lower 
ù . In a speech released yesterday (27 October), Mr Zhao warned that if 
widespread corruption amongst party and Government officials did not end, 
the party would lose the support of the peop le . . .  He said price increases, 
unfair distribution of wealth and official corruption were the main causes of 
public dissatisfaction. 
This potted history of recent official attempts to control corruption in China 
also reveals the extent to which corruption appears to have permeated all 
aspects of public and commercial dealings in China. Since 1950 the PRC 
government has experimented with many different systems of control: internal 
administrative audits, separate control commissions, discipline inspection bu- 
reaux and "supervision of the masses". None of these seem to have worked 
very weil. As the Beijing correspondent for The South China Morning Post 
observes, 
the potential for an independent system of supervision is further weakened 
by the pervasiveness of the problem. China's network of personal and 
back-doof relations - allowed to flourish in the eight years of market- 
oriented reform - precludes consistent disciplinary action against corrup- 
tion, just as it precludes an enforcement of building and spending prohib- 
itions. Nobody is scared and everyone has a friend in the right p lace . . .  The 
situation is aggravated by the fact that the central government is unable to 
regulate the economic processes it has set in motion and the fact that the 
prevailing economic "system" is neither fish nor fowl . . .  Corruption is also 
built into the very structure of the system. The overlap between state/ 
administrative and production/commercial authority is an open invitation 
for underpaid functionaries to transform their bureaucratic power into 
cash. 15 
In addition to such structurally and historically based scepticism, doubts have 
been expressed as to whether this public push against corruption would see a 
universal application in practice if corruption was openly exposed at the 
highest levels of the party's upper echelons. Agence France Press has quoted 
unidentified "diplomats" as stating that the latest campaign against corruption 
will fail, like the ones before it, to reveal the most powerful figures involved in 
abusing power for personal gain. It is suspected that fearing one leak about 
high level corruption could trigger a chain reaction in their ranks, reformists 
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and conservatives alike have an unspoken agreement that their business 
dealings will remain untouched 16. Whether such unsourced press speculation 
has any basis in fact is difficult to substantiate. As is the case with the very 
limited English language commentary on current affairs in the PRC, we are to 
a large extent slaves to a very small contingent of wire service writers and 
western press agencies. Even so, the dubious reaction to these recent anti- 
corruption initiatives says something about the past and present divergence 
between what is said and done äbout corruption in the PRC. 
The legal dimension 
It could always be argued that law reform on any issue may only indicate the 
posture of a legislature which should not be assumed to be synonymous with 
any commitment to action. Having said this, one should not depreciate the 
significance of new legislation as an indication of a government's intent, 
particuiarly in a jurisdiction such as the PRC where law revision is not a simple 
process. Further, in respect of the recent changes to the laws controlling 
corrupfion in China, their importance is increased by the fact that they attempt 
to make more concrete and enforceable the earlier legal sanctions. 
The most significant example of recent legislative reform to the laws control- 
ling corruption in the PRC is the Supplementary Provisions of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the Punishment of 
Bribery and Corruption (adopted by the 24th Session of the Standing Commit- 
tee of the Sixth National People's Congress, 21 January 1988). These Provi- 
sions are an adjunct to the Criminal Law of the PRC as amended by the 
Decision of the Standing Commitee of the National People's Congress Re- 
garding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously Undermine the 
Economy (adopted by the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth 
National People's Congress, 8 March 1982). The 1988 reforms are primarily 
concerned with three forms of serious economic crime: corruption, misappro- 
priation of public funds and bribery, all of which appear in some form in the 
Criminal Law of the PRC. Take for example corruption, which in its original 
form refers to situations where "stare personnel . . ,  take advantage of their 
office to engage in corruption involving articles of public property" (Art. 155) 
and as such lacks specificity in its object and its definition. The latter provisions 
clarify the requirements of the crime. Thus "engage in corruption" is replaced 
in section 1 with "embezzle, steal, defraud, or use other means illegally to take 
public property". While the object of the crime is not elaborated on, the 
potential authors of such offences now include "state functionaries, staff of 
collective economic entities and personnel in charge of public property". 
Further to the inclusion of corporate or collective offender categories is the 
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provision that "people who collude with state functionaries" etc. or "en- 
terprises, undertakings, institutions and organisations" (section 9) which may 
be non-state and while not being able to subjects of corruptions, can be 
punished if they offer bribes to public officials or conspire toward their 
corruption. This legislative mention of private or semi private organisations 
within the PRC, is of itself a significant recognition of the direction which the 
new economic order is taking. The punishments for such graft on balance are 
higher under the Provisions than earlier tariffs proposed for comparable 
offences. 
The Provisions have also created new crimes of graft. Misappropriation of 
public funds (embezzlement) is effectively a new offence. Section 3 now makes 
it an additional offence to misappropriate public funds in the following cases: 
- if the funds are for personal use to carry out illegal activities (i.e., smug- 
gling, gambling, or speculation); 
- if the amount is relatively large and is used to engage in profiteering; and 
- if the amount is also large and is not repaid after three months. 
This latter situation where failure to return public funds is deemed to be 
corruption, is interesting in the way in which it removes the emphasis from the 
"embezzlement" and redirects it to the retention and use of public funds as 
being the criminal act. Perhaps this is one of the practical recognitions in these 
Provisions that effective anti-corruption controls must have the potential of 
recouping moneys misappropriated as much as they are designed to punish the 
misappropriation itself. Section 12 extends this emphasis: 
All embezzled or misappropriated public property will be chased back. All 
benefits offered as a bribe will be confiscated. Embezzled or misappropri- 
ated public property when recovered will be returned to the original units. 
Those which by law should not be returned will be handed over to the state. 
Also it appears that the inference to be drawn from the obvious concern in the 
Provisions with the "return of large sums of money", is that minor forms of 
embezzlement will either be tolerated or will only provoke the internal dis- 
cipline of the local unit, and not of the law. 
In their focus on taking advantage of one's position to unlawfully acquire 
possession and use of public property for illegitimate purposes, the corruption 
and misappropriation offences are similar. They diverge in the means used to 
carry out the offence, and in the ultimate intention of the offender. If the 
property concerned is to be taken and used permanently as if the ownership 
had been transferred into private hands, this constitutes corruption. 
The bribery offence presented in sections 5 and 6 takes two forms: accepting 
a bribe and offering a bribe. These offences are now more clearly defined to 
include such activities as to "illegally accept and keep in personal possession 
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rebates, service charges, sales commissions etc. under false pretences". As 
with the corruption offence, "the possible subjects of this offence have been 
broadened, and those non-state personnel who collaborate in bribery may also 
be punished".17 
Section 6 is a very significant innovation for the operation of the criminal 
sanction in the PRC. It expands the categories of offender deserving of 
punishment from the individual to "enterprises, undertakings, institutions and 
organisations owned by the whole people". It is provided that where such 
bodies are involved "in serious cases of soliciting or accepting bribes in return 
for special advantages" they will be fined, and "responsible officials and others 
directly involved will be sentenced to not more than 5 years imprisonment or 
detention". This section should be considered in conjunction with section 9 
which provides fines for similar bodies which "seek improper advantages by 
offering bribes, or giving rebates or service fees.. .All bribes which have thus 
turned into (sic) private ownership shall be dealt with in the manner stipulated 
by paragraph 8 of these Supplementary Rules". 
Several other of these Provisions have created a framework for the legal 
regulation of corrupt practices which is in many important respects not dissimi- 
lar to the comparable laws in the PRC's closest common law neighbour, Hong 
Kong. For example, section 11 declares that "State functionaries whose wealth 
or expenditure far exceed their legal incomes may be required to account for 
the reasons for such differences. If no explanation can be made, the difference 
will be deemed to have derived from illegal sources. The person concerned is 
liable to not more than five years imprisonment or penal servitude, together 
with forfeiture of the difference, or simply forfeiture of the difference". This 
creates the same form of status offence and associated confiscation powers that 
exist in section 10 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, except that the 
latter affords the accused the potential to advance a "satisfactory explanation" 
to a court as a defence whereas the PRC provision presents the lack of 
explanation as an element of the offence. 
Enforcement of the anti-corruption initiatives 
Alison Conner in her review of the recent provisions in the PRC designed to 
control and punish corruption, concludes by asking whether these provisions 
can or will be enforced. In answer to her own rhetorical query she suggests: 
Perhaps the problems addressed by this legislation are not simply new, but 
also worse than in the past: thus the revisions show concern that more types 
of of fenders . . ,  are involved in these offences, that organised gangs with 
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ringleaders are a particular problem . . .  and that the funds or products 
obtained are being used to pursue further illegal activities. And what makes 
these offences so damaging makes them equally difficult to curb...18 
As it is the case that China is presently flirting with corporate capitalism as a 
means towards economic development, so too it now confronts the realisation 
that the opportunities for, styles of, and participants in corrupt behavour have 
altered along similar lines. The traditional problems confounding attempts to 
control corruption in China are now complicated and exaggerated by the push 
towards private/corporate business restructuring. Having said this it is not 
simply the advent in China of special economic zones, municipal autonomy, 
joint ventures, semi-private business enterprises and the like which have 
necessarily lead to a greater incidence and variety of graft. The basic contradic- 
tions on which the "new economic order" in China is being established allow 
for conditions which can encourage individual and corporate entrepreneurial 
enterprise where the line of legitmacy may be far from clear. These conditions 
and their consequences for corruption in China should pose a significant 
challenge for the development and implementation of control measures. Ap- 
patent political will, and its manifestation through legislative change and 
administrative initiatives are not in themselves novel in the PRC. What is 
unique at this time is the public recognition that there is a connection between 
government administration, party structure, individual greed, and economic 
development, which is supportive of corruption, and that this needs to be 
exposed and regulated at the highest levels for the sake of the financial and 
political security of the state. 
A public law enforcement agency with its focus on corruption in the PRC 
faces obvious operational difficulties. Article 13 of the Law of Criminal 
Procedure of the PRC stipulates that: 
cases involving crimes of corruption, violation of the democratic rights of 
citizens, and dereliction of duty, and other cases that the people's procurat- 
orates consider necessary directly to accept themselves, are to be filed and 
investigated by the people's procuratorates, which are to decide whether or 
not to initiate a public prosecution. 
This procuratorial body has the multiple powers of investigation and prose- 
cution when it comes to questions of public corruption. The Organisational 
Law of the People's Procuratorates of the PRC highlights the following 
characteristics of these functions: 
- The nationalisation of anti-corruption supervision 
- The universal application of anti-corruption regulations 
- The specialisation of anti-corruption law enforcement 
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- The assurance of enforceability when it comes to anti-corruption laws 
Despite the further declarations that the exercise of power by the Procurat- 
orates is independent, universal, law-centred, and considerate of popular 
expectations 19, the process of law enforcement in other respects throughout 
such a massive and diverse jurisdiction as the PRC would raise doubts about 
whether a criminal justice response to corruption in China has real prospects of 
S u c c e s s .  
Conclusion 
As this article indicates, China is presently endeavouring to tighten the eco- 
nomic activities of trading organisations in the mainland and outside its bor- 
ders, especially in Hong Kong. Under these readjustment measures as ad- 
vanced by the PRC, it is intended that only those well organised and reputable 
companies will survive. At the same time commercial and organisational 
power is being concentrated on a small and declining group of political and 
business leaders. In this respect it is hoped that corruption may be the province 
of an identifiable few, rather than permeating throughout all levels of both 
public and private sector middle management. 
This is also a recognition that styles of corruption in China are becoming 
more sophisticated, collective and dispersed. Therefore it is the government's 
intention that steps should be taken to limit this potential burgeoning of 
corruption by regulating the opportunities for graft. No doubt it is appreciated 
that as weil as being bettet able to ensure accountability and responsibility for 
corruption by limiting it at source, the government is better able to disguise its 
existence if its operation remains in the hands of a few identifiable officials. 
It would be wrong to view the Chinese concern with corruption as simply 
being a cultural phenomenon or something which is a natural by-product of a 
certain style of economic development. With power comes corruption. In the 
case of the PRC that power has for a long time been centralised and regional- 
ised. Add to this the reality that methods of corruption in the past have been 
limited by wage structures, financial organisation, and the framework of 
authority and decision making in the public life of China, and a unique agenda 
for corruption will obviously emerge. For example, a somewhat conspiratorial 
relationship has developed between the special economic zones and the rest of 
China when it comes to apportioning opportunities to find work in a SEZ. A 
senior official responsible for trade and commerce in Beijing may gain certain 
personal and commercial advantages by having bis son employed by a business 
enterprise in a SEZ. However this arrangement may see the official in a 
position of obligation to the operators of that business in the SEZ. To dis- 
charge bis duty in this regard, the official may endeavour to secure trading 
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opportunities for that business, which may directly or indirectly benefit his 
son. In this example there develops a process where the exchange of favours 
for advantage arises out of the economic imbalances which area consequence 
of the SEZ system. Naturally there are considerable grievances harboured by 
the masses of Chinese citizens who are unable to share in the easier living 
standards that they see in the SEZ's, either through legitimate or illegitimate 
means. The higher salaries and living subsidies, as weil as the radically lower 
rate of inflation enjoyed by those in the SEZ's 2°, is an obvious source of 
general public discontent, and a motivation to endeavouring to get a "slice of 
the pie" through any means which present themselves. In addition, the pop- 
ulation outside the SEZ's may take to corruption as a method of compensating 
for the imbalances in lifestyle which they see as being promoted by the new 
economic order. 
The recent actions taken by the central government of the PRC, to regulate 
economic corruption will in no way eradicate the problem. They are not 
intended to. Rather they are expected to bring about the following conse- 
quences: 
- Corruption will be confined to a group of very senior officials and offices, 
and will be taken away from the lower levels of commercial enterprise. 
- As a result, those cases of corruption which will be prosecuted by the state 
will involve a smaller and perhaps more influential class of people rather 
than the present widespread of defendants. It may be also that due to the 
nature of the "corruptors", and the fact that public sensitivity about corrup- 
tion should diminish, fewer cases of corruption will be reported. 
- With corruption moving more into the control of a political and economic 
"elite", its presence will be easier to seal off and disguise. 
- Anti-corruption agencies will be a priority if for no other reason than the 
government has publicly identified corruption as a challenge to national 
economic advancement, and therefore organised attempts at its control 
must assume a high domestic and international profile. 
- Due to the tight government control over the news media in the PRC, the 
apparent reduction in the incidence and danger of graft can be as weil 
orchestrated through the press as appears to have been the official candour 
and concern for its existence, and finally 
- The division between corrupt practices and legitimate influence will be- 
come even more indistinct. For example, who will be able to distinguish 
between benevolence and graft when the son or daughter of a senior official 
is given a scholarship from a friendly private-sector foundation, to study 
abroad? 
Speculation about the future face of economic corruption in China is of limited 
value when one is interested in questions of regulation and control. As the 
definition, indication and interpretation of corruption is a political process 
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which may pay little regard to realistic indicators, so too the creation of control 
initiatives may not be dependent on predictions of actual developments in 
graft. We have endeovoured to show that recent regulatory programmes in the 
PRC themselves indicate rauch about the commercial contradictions that 
underly the new economic order, as weil as evidencing the socio-legal dilem- 
mas inherent in anti-corruption official discourse. 
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